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TORTS - PARENTAL IMMUNITY:

A TIME FOR CHANGE
Ard v. Ard, 414 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1982)

Plaintiff, an unemancipated minor,1 was injured when struck by a motor
vehicle. 2 His guardian brought suit against the child's mother and her two
liability insurance carriers.3 The complaint alleged the mother negligently unloaded her son from her vehicle, placing him in peril.4 The defendants raised
the defense of parental immunity and the trial court granted a motion for
summary judgment on that basis. 5 Reversing the trial court, the First District
Court of Appeal upheld the right of an unemancipated minor child to bring
suit against his parent for personal injuries caused by that parent's negligence.6
On certification, 7 the Florida Supreme Court affirmed and HELD, in a tort
action brought for negligence resulting in an automobile accident, the parental
tort immunity doctrine would be waived to the extent of the parent's liability
insurance coverage.8
Common law courts allowed property and contract actions between parent
and child. 9 There was no basis in common law for the development of the
parental tort immunity doctrine as no personal injury actions between parent
and child were recorded prior to 1891.10 Despite the absence of direct common
law support, acceptance of the parental tort immunity doctrine has been
justified by analogy to the widely accepted common law doctrine of interspousal tort immunity."1 Many early authorities recognized that a child's
1.

See Commentary, ParentalImmunity: The Case for Abrogation of ParentalImmunity

in Florida,25 U. FLA. L. Ray. 794, 794 n2 (1973) (explanation of who is an unemancipated
child in Florida for purposes of the parental immunity concept).
2. 414 So. 2d 1066, 1066 (Fla. 1982). The supreme court opinion stated another vehicle
struck the plaintiff. This conflicts with the lower court's factual determination that plaintiff
was struck by his mother's vehicle. See Ard v. Ard, 395 So. 2d 586, 587 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1981).
3. 414 So. 2d at 1066-67.
4. Id. at 1066.
5. Id. at 1067.
6. 395 So. 2d at 586. The court concluded there existed no controlling precedent in this
state, since the Florida Supreme Court previously had only recognized the rule by dictum.
Id. at 587.
7. FLA. CONsr. art. V, § 3(b)(4). The question certified -was: "WHETHER AN UNEMANCIPATED MINOR CHILD MAY MAINTAIN A NEGLIGENCE ACTION AGAINST
HIS PARENT." 395 So. 2d at 590.
8. 414 So. 2d at 1067. Although not specifically stated, the instant decision emphasizes
that the accident involved a motor vehicle, for which liability insurance is widely available.
Courts interpreting this ruling may have been invited to limit it to the facts notwithstanding the broad language of the question certified and answered affirmatively. See supra note 7.
9. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 122, at 865 (4th ed. 1971); Hollister,
Parent-Child Immunity: A Doctrine in Search of Justification, 50

FORDHAM

L. Ray. 489, 497

& nn.63 & 64 (1982).
10. McCurdy, Torts Between Parent and Child, 5 Vn.L. L. REv. 521, 527 (1960). There
were, however, cases involving actions against one in loco parentis, on the premise that a
parent would be liable in a similar situation. See McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in
Domestic Relation, 43 HAav. L. REv. 1030, 1061-63 (1930) [hereinafter cited as McCurdy 1].
11. RESTATEMENT (S cON) OF TORTS § 895G comment c (1977).
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independent legal status made the analogy to spousal immunity improper. 1 2
Under common law, the husband and wife were treated as one, but no similar
3
unity of legal identity arose from the relationship between parent and child.'
14
Whereas a wife was subordinate to her husband in all legal matters, a
child was a separate legal entity capable of owning property and making
contracts.'9 More importantly, a child's ability to sue and be sued allowed him
to enforce his own choses in action, including those in tort.16
The parental immunity doctrine is the product of judicial policy-making
by the Mississippi Supreme Court in Hewellette v. George.'7 A minor plaintiff
sued her mother for injuries sustained through false imprisonment.18 Without
citing any authority,19 the court held the suit could not be maintained while
the child was unemancipaed.2 0 The court reasoned that public policy required the preservation of "the peace of society, and of the families composing
society."

2
1

Although Hewellette involved an intentional tort,2 2 many courts readily
extended its holding to negligence actions. 23 Courts justified parental tort im12. See W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 122, at 865 (decisions in Canada and Scotland held
such an action would lie). See also Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 356-57, 150 A. 905, 907
(1930) (English authors viewed the child as having a clear capacity to sue the parent for tort).
13. W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 122, at 864-65. For an excellent discussion of the parentchild relationship in comparison to that of husband and wife, see McCurdy, supra note 10, at

521-27.
14. The wife's legal existence was suspended for the duration of the marriage, with
respect to her personal and property rights. These rights were merged into those of the
husband, and thus, she could not sue or be sued without joining the husband as a plaintiff
or defendant. The effect was to make it impossible for an individual to sue his spouse, because
to do so would have been to sue himself. W. PROSSER, supra note 9, at 859-60.
15. See McCurdy, supra note 10, at 523.
16. Id. Suit will usually be brought on the child's behalf by a next friend. If a child is
sued, he will be represented by a guardian ad litem. Normally, a parent will act in these
roles, unless his interests are adverse to those of the child. Thus, no procedural difficulty prevents a child from maintaining a civil action against a parent. Id.
17. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1391).
18. Id. The action was brought against the estate of her deceased mother, a factor which
substantially lessens the subsequently expressed judicial justification for the immunitypreservation of family harmony. Id.
19. See Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 358, 150 A. 905, 908 (1930) (asserting Hewellette
adopted a new rule of exceptional character and did not enforce an established rule).
20. 68 Miss. at 711, 9 So. at 887. The minor plaintiff had been married, but was separated
and living with her mother at the time of the alleged injuries. Id. It is generally accepted that
marriage will emancipate a minor. The court remanded to determine if the parent-child relationship had been reinstated and indicated that if the marriage had dissolved the parent
and child relationship, such an action could be maintained. Id.
21. Id. The court opined that the state's criminal laws provided the child with sufficient
protection. Id.
22. Id. The intentional tort complained of was malicious incarceration in an insane
asylum. Other courts soon recognized immunity for intentional acts. See McKelvey v.
McKelvey, Ill Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903) (action by a child against father and stepmother
for cruel and inhuman treatment); Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905) (action by
daughter against father for rape), limited, Merrick v. Sutterlin, 93 Wash. 2d 411, 610 P.2d
891 (1980).
23. See Mesite v. Kirchstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 A. 753 (1929); Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C.
577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923); Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R.I. 131, 131 A. 198 (1925).
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munity to preserve domestic harmony and tranquility,24 to avoid interference
with parental care, discipline, and control,25 to avoid fraud and collusion be27
tween parent and child,26 and to prevent the depletion of family assets.
The Florida Supreme Court initially recognized parental immunity in
Orefice v. Albert,28 which involved the death of a minor child in an airplane
crash caused by the negligence of his father, a co-owner of the plane. 29 The
action against the father was dismissed, and the only cause of action held permissible was against the plane's other co-owner based on ownership of a
dangerous instrumentality.0 The court recognized the state's established
policy of disallowing tort suits among family members", to preserve family
32
harmony and resources.
Like many other judicial creations, the parental tort immunity doctrine
is mutable. 3 Numerous exceptions have eroded the doctrine to such an extent
that few jurisdictions still accept complete parental immunity.3 4 Many jurisdictions partially abrogated the doctrine to allow a child to sue the parent for
24. See Roller v. Roller, 87 Wash. 242, 242-43, 79 P. 788, 788-89 (1905).
25. Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R.I. 131, 132-33, 131 A. 198, 199 (1925) (father has the
"duty to control, protect, support, and to guide or educate the child. The reciprocal duty of
the child is to serve and obey the father."). But see Holodook v. Spencer, 86 N.Y.2d 35, 324
N.EM2d 38, 364 N.YS&2d 859 (Ct. App. 1974) (holding parents owe no legal duty of proper
supervision to their children).
26. See, e.g., Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F.2d 677, 679 (D.C. Cir. 1948); James, Accident
Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance,57 YALE L.J. 549, 553 (1948).
27. Roller v. Roller, 87 Wash. 242. 245, 79 P. 788, 789 (1905).
28. 237 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1970). Cf. Shivers v. Sessions, 80 So. 2d 905, 907-08 (Fla. 1955)
(allowing a wrongful death action by child against stepfather without addressing the
possibility of parental immunity).
29. 237 So. 2d at 143.
80. Id. at 146. The court conceded the evidence pointed toward no active negligence on
the part of the co-owner. Id. at 143.
31. Id. at 145. Since Orefice, every district court of appeal except the first has
affirmed parental immunity. See Withrow v. Woods, 886 So. 2d 607 (Fla. 5th D.CA. 1980);
Horton v. Unigard Ins. Co., 355 So. 2d 154 (4th D.CA. 1978), cert. dismissed, 378 So. 2d
459 (Fla. 1979); Wright v. Farmers' Reliance Ins. Co., 814 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1975);
Vinci v. Gensler, 269 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 2d D.CA. 1972) (per curiam).
32. 237 So. 2d at 145. But see Vinci v. Gensler, 269 So. 2d 20, 20-22 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1972)
(per curiam) (Liles, J., dissenting).
33. See Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 434, 224 A.2d 588, 590 (1966). Since the field of
torts is dynamic, tort rules must be constantly examined. If the legislature fails to act when
justice requires, then the judiciary'must do so. Id.
84. See generally RErATEMNT (SECoND), supra note 11, § 895G comments d-i. Courts
have permitted actions against a parent who has intentionally, wantonly, or willfully
injured the child. E.g., Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 429-30, 289 P.2d 218, 228-24 (1955);
Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill. 2d 608, 619, 131 N.E.2d 525, 531 (1956); Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md.
61, 68, 77 A.2d 923, 926 (Ct. App. 1951). Parental immunity does not bar an emancipated child
from bringing suit against his parent for personal injuries. See, e.g., Martinez v. Southern
Pac. Co., 45 Cal. 2d 244, 253-54, 288 P.2d 868, 878 (1955); Lancaster v. Lancaster, 213 Miss. 536,
541, 57 So. 2d 802, 804-05 (1952);. Logan v. Reaves, 209 Tenn. 631, 634-37, 854 S.W.2d 789,
790-91 (1962). Furthermore, courts have allowed suits by minor children for injuries inflicted
by the parent while acting in a business capacity. E.g., Trevarton v. Trevarton, 151 Colo. 418,
422-23, 878 PRd 640, 642-43 (1963); Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928, 980-31 (Tex. 1971);
Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 17, 4 S.E.2d 343, 350 (1939).
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injuries caused by the negligent operation of an automobile.3 5 One of the
chief factors involved in creating this exception has been the existence of
6

liability insurance.3

The California Supreme Court rejected the parental tort immunity doctrine
in Gibson v. Gibson.3 7 A minor plaintiff was injured by an automobile as a
result of his father's allegedly negligent instructions35 The court concluded
the danger to family harmony and the fear of fraudulent actions could no longer
legitimately support parental immunity. 39 The court, however, conceded that
parents must be accorded sufficient discretion to adequately perform their
parental functions. 40 The court's solution was to abrogate parental immunity
and replace it with a standard of reasonableness viewed in light of the parental

role. 41 In considering whether a parent negligently exercised this discretion, a
jury would determine whether a reasonably prudent parent would have
exercised such discretion under similar circumstances.

42

The instant case presented an opportunity for the Florida Supreme Court
to reconsider the parental tort immunity doctrine in this state. The court
reaffirmed the importance of parental immunity, expressing great concern for
the intrusion upon the family relationship that would result from litigation
between parent and child.4 3 The court was equally concerned about jeopardiz-

35. Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8, 15 (Alaska 1967); Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 89, 471
P.2d 282, 285 (1970); Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 227 Kan. 758, 769-70, 611 P.2d 135, 142 (1980);
Lee v. Coiner, 224 S.E.2d 721, 724 (W. Va. 1976). Two other jurisdictions waive the doctrine
to the extent the damages are covered by the parent's liability insurance. Williams v. Williams,
369 A.2d 669, 673 (Del. 1976); Sorenson v. Sorenson, 369 Mass. 350, 352-53, 339 N.E.2d 907, 909
(1975).
36. See McCurdy, supra note 10, at 545.
37. 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971).
38. Id. at 916, 479 P.2d at 649, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 289. Plaintiff was being driven by his
father in a car, which was towing a jeep. His father stopped the car on the highway, and
instructed plaintiff to get out and correct the position of the jeep's wheels. While doing so,
plaintiff was struck by another vehicle. Id. at 916, 479 P.2d at 648-49, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 288-89.
39. Id. at 919-20, 479 P.2d at 651, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 291.
40. Id. at 921, 479 P.2d at 658, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293. Cf. Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421,
430, 289 P.2d 218, 224 (1955) ("Iparental] discretion does not include the right willfully to
inflict personal injuries beyond the limits of reasonable parental discipline.").
41. 3 Cal. 3d at 921, 479 P.2d at 658, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 298. The California Supreme Court,
in abrogating the doctrine, was heavily persuaded by two factors: the public policy to
compensate injured persons, and the existence of liability insurance. Id. at 922, 479 P.2d at
653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
42. Id. at 921, 479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293. The exact standard is: "What would
an ordinarily reasonable and prudent parent have done in similar circumstances?" See also
Recent Developments, Torts-ParentalImmunity - Merrick v. Sutterlin, 56 WASH. L. REV. 319,
334 (1981). Thus, a parent could introduce into evidence any unique factors pertaining to the
situation, such as a child's behavioral problems. Id. Because the standards' applicability
depends upon the individual facts of each case, each jury will make the factual determination.
But see Pedigo v. Rowley, 610 P.2d 560, 564 (Idaho 1980) (holding that the citizens of its
state were "too diverse and independent to be judged by a common standard in such a delicate
area as the parent-child relationship.").
43. 414 So. 2d at 1067.
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ing the availability of sufficient familial assets to support, protect, and educate
44
the family unit.
The majority, however, tempered its adherence to parental tort immunity
by noting contemporary social conditions militate against retaining the
doctrine.45 One of the foremost innovations is the widespread availability of
liability insurance. 4" The court recognized that the availability of liability insurance negates many of the policies underlying parental immunity because
47
suits between child and parent can become suits between child and insurer.
48
A suit against the insurer does not disrupt family harmony and actually preserves the family's assets. 49 The court, therefore, limited its abrogation of the
doctrine to the extent of the parents' liability insurance coverage. 50
The instant court refused to allow the possibility of fraud and. collusion to
negate a child's claim for compensation.51 Adopting the reasoning of numerous
other jurisdictions, the court expressed confidence in the ability of trial judges
and juries to closely scrutinize the evidence.52 The court provided insurance
companies with an additional measure of protection by noting public policy
allows insurers to negotiate the scope of coverage and to exclude injury to
family members from liability insurance coverage. 53 Additionally, premiums
can be adjusted to reflect the change in actuarial bases occasioned by the instant

44. Id. In thus recognizing the need to protect family harmony and resources, the court
was merely reiterating the policy rationale of Orefice.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1068.

47. Id. (citing Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 88, 471 P.2d 282, 284 (1970)). In his
dissenting opinion, Justice Boyd stated that being on opposite sides of a lawsuit inherently
puts people in an adversary position regardless of the presence of insurance. Id. at 1070 (Boyd,
J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 1068-69 (citing Sorenson v. Sorenson, 369 Mass. 350, 362, 339 N.E.2d 907, 914
(1975)). Instead of promoting disharmony, the action will undoubtedly ease the family's
financial difficulties resulting from the child's injuries. But cf. id. at 1070 (Boyd, J., dissenting)
(tort actions for ordinary negligence will inevitably lead to disruption of family harmony).
49. Id. at 1068 (citing Sorenson v. Sorenson, 369 Mass. 350, 362, 339 N.E2d 907, 914

(1975)).
50. Id. at 1067. The court recognized that the immunity waiver will most often obtain

in automobile accidents because more parents own automobile liability insurance. Id. at 1068.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Boyd expressed concern that this holding will be applied
to instances of ordinary negligence. Id. at 1070 (Boyd, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 1069. See also Borst v.,Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 653, 251 P.2d 149, 154 (1952). The
possibility of fraud and collusion accompanies all litigation. 414 So. 2d at 1069. Other courts

have similarly observed there is just as much chance of fraud and collusion in an action

between an emancipated child and parent. See, e.g., Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d at 920, 479

P.2d at 651, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 291. It is interesting to note that the fraud and collusion argument is the exact opposite of the family harmony argument.
52. 414 So. 2d at 1069 (citing Brooks v. Robinson, 259 Ind. 16, 21, 284 N.E.2d 794, 797
(1972)). The court observed that the close relationship between the parties would naturally

make their testimony more vulnerable to impeachment. Id. at 1069.
53. Id. at 1069. See Reid v. State Farm Fire 8- Casualty Co., 352 So. 2d 1172, 1173 (Fla.

1977). The Reid court interpreted the requirement of "security" under the Florida Automobile
Reparations Act to refer only to no-fault personal injury protection benefits. In essence, the
Act did not prohibit exclusion clauses for family members. Id.
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decision. 54 The court further qualified its holding by determining the parental
tort immunity doctrine would not be waived if the parent were without liability
insurance or if the policy excluded coverage for family members. 55
In limiting recovery solely to the amount of the parent's liability insurance
coverage, the instant court substantially lessened the impact of its decision. Insurance companies now have an added incentive either to implement family
exclusion clauses or to impose unaffordable premium rates.5 6 Many parents
will consequently be without liability insurance coverage for their minor
children.5 7 Without such coverage, under the court's reasoning, no liability
can exist 58 because the parental tort immunity doctrine remains intact. The
court could have avoided this sophistry either by declaring the exclusion
clauses void as a matter of public policy 59 or by entirely abrogating the parental
tort immunity doctrine without regard to the presence or absence of liability
insurance.

0

By failing to hold exclusionary clauses in liability insurance contracts void,
the court necessarily detracted from its conclusion that the danger of fraud and
collusion is minimal. Insurers can use other means to guard against fraud. For
example, they can require cooperation clauses in their policy and disclaim liability for lack of cooperation. 6' Additionally, the insurer's interests would be
protected at all times because the company's counsel generally represents the
parent.62
Even if the parental tort immunity doctrine were entirely abrogated, the
policies justifying the doctrine may not be compromised. If the parent being
sued actually owned liability insurance, according to the court, there would
be no threat to the family.6 3 On the other hand, it is unlikely a suit would be
54. 414 So. 2d at 1069-70 (citing Florida Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Government Employees
Ins. Co., 387 So. 2d 932, 934 (Fla. 1980)).
55. Id. at 1067.
56. Id. at 1070-71 (Boyd, J., dissenting). A family will no longer be able to secure financial
protection.
57. See Florida Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 387 So. 2d 932,
934 (Fla. 1980). Even though the parent has the option to negotiate with different insurance
companies for the best coverage, the end result will often be no coverage for the minor child
58. 414 So. 2d at 1071.
59. See Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Wiscomb, 97 Wash. 2d 203, 643 P.2d 441 (1982).
The court analyzed the Washington Financial Responsibility Act and found the Act created
"a strong public policy in favor of assuring monetary protection and compensation" to those
injured by the negligence of others. Id.
- 643 P.2d at 442-43. The court declared that
family exclusion clauses violated the state's public policy of assuring compensation to victims
of negligent drivers. Id. at _
643 P.2d at 446. Accord Hughes v. State Farm Mutual Auto.
Ins. Co., 236 N.W.2d 870, 885-86 (N.D. 1975) (holding that a family exclusion clause in a
motor vehicle liability insurance policy was void as violative of state public policy).
60. See, e.g., Peterson v. City & County of Honolulu, 51 Haw. 484, 486, 462 P.2d 1007, 1008
(1970).
61. Sorenson v. Sorenson, 369 Mass. 350, 364, 339 N.E.2d 907, 915 (1975).
62. Id. See also Lee v. Comer, 224 S.E.2d 721, 726 (W. Va. 1976) (Neely, J., concurring)
(advocating that an insurer should have the option of either defending the insured or being
the real party in interest).
63. Where there is insurance coverage, a family may actually be melded closer together
since all family members will be seeking reparation for the child. Comment, Child v. Parent:
Erosion of the Immunity Rule, 19 HAsrINGs L.J. 201, 217 (1967).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol35/iss1/10

6

Postler: Torts--Parental Immunity: A Time for Change
j983]

CASE COMMENTS

brought absent insurance. 4 A suit brought against an uninsured parent dearly
indicates a seed of discord already existed within the familyf 5 and there would
then be no family harmony to protect.6 6 By waiving parental immunity only to
the extent of insurance coverage and then inviting insurers to write familial
exclusion clauses, the Florida Supreme Court strikes a hollow compromise be-

tween the competing needs to compensate injured minors and to pTeqeive
family harmony.
The instant court's desire to protect the family unit from uiwaanted intrusions is laudable. By limiting abrogation of the parental immunity doctrine
only to negligence actions, however, the court failed to recognize the boundaries
of the parent-child relationship. Court admittedly should not intrude tInnecessarily upon pArental discretion and authority, but harming a Minor
child through the negligent operation of an automobile involves no exercise
of parental discipline or authority. 7 The court failed to recognize that in cases
of parental negligence the injury- itself, and not the litigation, disrupts the
family.Q8 By ffirming the doctrine of parental tort immunity, the instant c9urt
effectively shields uncontrolled parental discretion from judicial scrutiny when
no liability insurance exists.09
Strong support exists for lessening the court's strict adherence to the
parental tort immunity doctrine. The court's concern with protecting family
harmony and resources is heavily outweighed by society's interet in providing
a negligently injured child with a r.emedy. 70 A generally accepted tort law
principle states that in cases involving negligent or tortious conduct, liability
should be the rule and immunity the exception.71 The instant court transposes
this principle by making immunity the rule and liability the exception. Allowing the presence or absence of insurance to be the legally significant factor
upon which liability turns is a difficult doctrinal position for Florida law to
establish. Furthermore, it is illogical to prohibit a child from suing his parents
72
in tort when he is already able t9 sue them in pr9perty aiI contract. It is
not at all dear that donrestic harmony c9pild be .isturbed by the former and

Q4.

See Sorenson v. Sorenson, 369 Mas. 3?0, 361, 339 NYE,2d 907, 918 (1915); Janjes, §yprp

note 26, at 553.
65. Sorenson v. Sorenson, 369 Mass. 850, 362, 339 N.E.2d 907, 914 (1975).
66. Badigian v. Badigian, 9 N.Y.2d 472, 478, 174 N.E.2d 718, 722, 215 N.Y.S2d 35, 40
(1961) (Fuld, J., dissenting) ("[F]amily harmony must already be at so low an ebb that it is
grotesque to deny the child a remedy in the name of preserving that harmony.'), overruled,
Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 438, 245 N.E.2d 192, 193, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529, 531 (1969).
67. See Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d at 920-21, 479 P.2d at 652, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 292 ("t]he parent
who negligently backs his automobile into his child . . .cannot claim that his parental role
will be threatened if the infant is permitted to sue for negligence.').
68. See Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 380, 282 A.2d 351, 855 (1971).
69. See Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d at 921, 479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293 (the 'guise of
p .rental attority has often meant unreviewable discretion).
70. See Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8, 15 (Alaska 1967).
71. President of Georgetovn College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1949); MuskoRf
v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 219, 359 P.2d 457, 462, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 94 (1951).
72. See Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio 566, 576, 103 N.E.2d 743, 748 (1952).
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